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Policing the Religious Airwaves: A Case of 
Market Place Regulation 
Jeffrey K Hadden* 
I. INTRODUCTION: OF TELEVANGELISTS, SCANDAL, MARKET 
PRESSURES AND GOVERNMENT 
The movement of a few television preachers into politics 
during the early 1980s led to the widely held perception that 
the televangelists had trespassed the serpentine wall that has 
traditionally separated religion and politics. 1 As tormented 
money and sex scandals unfolded-not in the supermarket 
tabloids but on the evening television news and on ABC's 
Nightline-millions of Americans concluded that the 
televangelists were living beyond accountability.2 
* Professor of Sociology at the University of Virginia. Published works on 
religious broadcasting include PRIME TIME PREACHERS (1981) and TELEVANGELISM: 
POWER AND POLITICS ON GoD'S FRONTIER (1988). 
1 This was not the first time religious broadcasters stepped over the 
preaching-politicking line. The most celebrated case was that of Father Charles E. 
Coughlin, a Roman Catholic parish priest from a Detroit suburb, who began radio 
broadcasting in 1926. Gradually, his sermons became highly politicized. In 1932, he 
actively supported the presidential candidacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt and then 
later became Roosevelt's bitter enemy. So daunting were Coughlin's attS:cks that 
Roosevelt had Coughlin's mailing privileges revoked under the Espionage Act of 
1917, and considered having him indicted for sedition before choosing to persuade 
the priest's archbishop to silence him. 
2 The televangelism scandals commenced in early 1987, when Oral Roberts 
sent out a direct-mail fundraising appeal in which he claimed that God would "call 
him home" if he failed to raise $8 million by the first of April. The secular press 
picked up the story and treated it as something between a tragic scam and high 
comedy. The count down to April Fools Day was preempted, however, on March 
19, when Jim Bakker, then head of the Praise The Lord (PTL) religious 
broadcasting empire, resigned in disgrace after allegations of sexual and other 
misconduct. Bakker, with his wife and broadcast partner Tammy Faye at his side, 
tearfully described the cause for his resignation. By his account, a long past and 
forgiven sexual encounter with a former church secretary was now being used 
against him by former friends. But there was more. The sordid details unfolded for 
months revealing high salaries and high living built on a pyramid-like scheme of 
"life time partnerships" guaranteeing free accommodations at Heritage USA, a 
Christian theme park created by the Bakkers. Bakker eventually turned the empire 
over to Jerry Falwell, a Virginia-based fundamentalist broadcaster who had gained 
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If ever the time was ripe for the government to step in and 
regulate religious broadcasters, it was in the late 1980s. But 
religious broadcasters had not taken orders from worldly 
authorities in the past, and the misdeeds of some of their 
broadcast colleagues were not enough to temper their fierce 
independence. When called before the oversight committee of 
the House Ways and Means Committee in October 1987, 
several of the nation's leading religious broadcasters told 
Congressman J. J. Pickle (D-Tex.) and his colleagues that they 
were quite capable of regulating themselves. While religious 
broadcasters spoke softly, if sternly, the executive director of 
their trade association, the National Religious Broadcasters 
(NRB), went on the attack. Ben Armstrong labeled the Pickle 
hearings an "insidious" attack and "the beginning of a new 
'inquisition,"' against religious broadcasters.3 
The new inquisition never materialized. Congressman 
Pickle's subcommittee has kept a watchful eye on religious 
broadcasters, as has the Internal Revenue Service. But the 
pattern of federal government agency monitoring has been one 
of quietly seeking information and, where questions of 
compliance with government regulations arose, of privately 
seeking compliance.4 
Critics of religious broadcasters complained that the cozy 
political alliance between the televangelists and conservative 
White House incumbents effectively squelched inquiries by 
federal regulatory agencies. While this proposition would seem 
international visibility in 1980 as the head of a political organization called the 
Moral Majority. But before all of the details of the PTL scandal were revealed, 
Louisiana-based televangelist Jimmy Swaggart was caught in the presence of a 
prostitute by a rival small-time television preacher. Some months later Swaggart 
was again caught in the presence of a prostitute, this time by police officers who 
had stopped him for a moving violation. These scandals destroyed the television 
empires of Bakker and Swaggart. Perhaps more importantly, they cast a shroud of 
doubt on the integrity of all religious broadcasters. 
3 Michael Isikoff, Evangelists Defend Funding Tactics, THE WASHINGTON 
POST, October, 7, 1987, at C4. 
4 While federal agencies have chosen a quiet, almost private path to 
monitoring religious broadcasters, this has not always been the case at the state 
level of government. For example, Texas Attorney General Dan Morales publicly 
pursued litigation against televangelist Robert G. Tilton following an expose by 
ABC's Prime Time Live in late 1991. U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks of Austin 
threw out the suit against Tilton and admonished Morales, noting that the 
attorney general's investigation was "neither professional nor responsible, bordering 
on unethical, and constitutes bad faith." Nancy St. Pierre, U.S. Court Judge 
Criticizes Morales in Tilton Inquiry, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, March 19, 1992, at 
13A. 
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to have some prima facie merit, the argument advanced in this 
article is that market forces should be the primary instrument 
for the regulation of religious broadcasting. The conclusion 
reached is that notwithstanding the encroachments of some 
religious broadcasters into the arena of politics, and the 
scandals and shame that befell some broadcast ministries, 
governmental and market structures for policing religious 
broadcasters appear to be in place and working well. The 
future, however, may be more problematic. This uncertain 
future stems from underlying structural developments in the 
communications industry and in the changing legal character of 
the culture, not from the scandals that rocked religious 
broadcasting in the late 1980s. 
To date, policing of the religious airwaves has taken place 
at two levels. First, religious broadcasters have been subjected 
to essentially the same regulatory principles that govern all 
broadcasting in America. 5 If the radio and television preachers 
sometimes appear to be operating in a relatively unfettered 
manner, it is because broadcasting in the United States 
operates with greater latitude and freedom from government 
interference than broadcasting in any other nation. Although 
not the subject of this piece, it is interesting to note that 
religious broadcasting is, in many ways, a macrocosm of the 
broadcast industry itself. 
The second level of regulation of religious broadcasters is a 
complex web of informal social controls. These informal social 
controls operate most effectively on the level of the broadcast 
networks, the level of local radio and television station 
managers and owners, and the level of the viewing and 
listening audiences which support the access of religious 
broadcasters to the airwaves. This Article takes on the task of 
exploring the history of how these informal social controls 
evolved and worked. 
Notwithstanding the general effectiveness of informal 
social controls, the trend of the modem welfare state is toward 
the involvement of government in virtually every aspect of 
public and private life. This portends a similar fate for religion 
in general and religious broadcasting specifically. In the 
concluding section, this paper will explore the implications of 
this development. 
5 The primary regulatory agency of the government, of course, is the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC). 
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II. FORMAL REGULATORY STRUCTURES AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
IN RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING 
The Radio Act of 1912, which actually preceded regular 
broadcasting, did not adequately anticipate the problems of this 
new communications medium. Indeed, these early days of radio 
broadcasting were characterized by few regulations. A talented 
engineer could build a station for a few hundred dollars, and 
anyone could obtain a license. These have been characterized 
as the "wild and wooly days of radio'>~~ and as a "frenzied 
frequency free-for-all."7 Ben Armstrong, former Executive 
Director of the National Religious Broadcasters, described what 
happened: "Stations competed for the airwaves all across the 
frequency band, drowning one another in bedlam of squeaks, 
whistles, and disjointed words."8 
One of the most celebrated renegades of this early era was 
Aimee Semple McPherson, an early superstar of radio 
evangelism. McPherson's shifting of power and frequency was 
sufficiently annoying that Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover ordered her station in Los Angeles closed. Enraged by 
this action, McPherson fired an angry telegram to Hoover 
saying, "Please order your minions of Satan to leave my station 
alone. You cannot expect the Almighty to abide by your wave 
length nonsense. When I offer my prayers to Him I must fit 
into His wave reception. Open this station at once."9 In the 
end, Hoover didn't have the authority to shut down 
McPherson's station. It took the Radio Act of 1927, which 
created a federal agency with the power to license and regulate 
radio broadcasting, to bring it under some semblance of 
control. 10 This episode teaches at least three enduring lessons 
6 Kimberly A. Neuendorf, The Public Trust Versus the Almighty Dollar, in 
REUGIOUS TELEVISION: CONTROVERSIES AND CONCLUSIONS 73 (Robert Abelman and 
Steward M. Hoover eds., 1990). 
7 Dennis N. Voskuil, The Power of the Air: Evangelicals and the Rise of 
Religious Broadcasting, in AMERICAN EVANGELICALS AND THE MASS MEDIA 72 
(Quentin J. Schultze ed., 1990). 
8 BEN ARMSTRONG, THE ELECTRIC CHURCH 24 (1979). 
9 JEFFREY K. HADDEN & CHARLES E. SWANN, PRIME TIME PREACHERS 188· 
89 (1981). Whether Aimee Semple McPherson believed the Department of 
Commerce agents literally to be "minions of satin" or merely intrusive bureaucrats, 
it is clear that she believed they had no legitimate basis for interfering with her 
broadcasting. There remains today a significant number of religious broadcasters 
who share that view. 
10 This was one of the classic confrontations in the politics of American 
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concerning the relationship between religious broadcasters and 
public policy. 
First, some regulation of broadcasting, religious and 
otherwise, would be necessary to safeguard stations from 
technical interference by other stations, to insure that the 
limited spectrum of frequencies available to broadcasters would 
be utilized efficiently and fairly, and to prevent misuse by those 
who would influence society in ways judged harmful. 11 These 
considerations, taken together, virtually assured that 
government would play some role, probably a critical one, in 
regulating radio and television broadcasting. 12 Government 
could not and would not, after all, stand by while renegade 
broadcasters transmitted their signals in whatever direction 
caught their fancy, or while high-power stations drowned out 
lower-power stations. 
Second, while the incident of a flamboyant and highly 
visible female preacher, such as Aimee Semple McPherson, 
may lend credence to the perception that religious broadcasters 
are the principal abusers of the airwaves, in reality abuse of 
the airwaves is by no :q1eans restricted to religious 
broadcasters. Aimee Semple McPherson was not and would not 
be the only broadcaster to violate simple norms of civility, such 
as, avoiding interference with other broadcasters.13 Quite 
deservedly, the behavior of religious broadcasters has been the 
broadcasting. McPherson was a self-made evangelist without professional 
credentials, yet she was one of the most gifted radio evangelists of the 2oth 
Century. In her indomitable resistance she succeeded in facing down a powerful 
Washington politician who just three years later would become the President of the 
United States. 
11 For a more detailed discussion of the rationale for broadcast regulation, 
see S\'DNEY W. HEAD, WORLD BROADCASTING SYSTEMS 129-61 (1985). 
12 Clearly, preventing technical interference and protecting a scarce resource 
are more readily defined and executed than determining "the public interest" and 
"misuse" of the airwaves. The first two objectives have been managed relatively 
easy by the regulatory agency, while the latter two have periodically engaged 
executive, judicial and legislative branches of government. 
13 As to Aimee Semple McPherson being singled out for punitive attention, 
the historical record as to whether her practice was more egregious than that of 
others is not clear. My informed speculation is that it was not. I suspect 
McPherson was singled out because of the content and style of her broadcasts. An 
important lesson of the McPherson case is that we ought to examine the behavior 
of religious broadcasters in the light of broadcasting industry standards rather than 
from the perspective of externally imposed standards. To demand that regulatory 
agencies hold religious broadcasters to higher standards than other broadcasters is 
to introduce prejudice that, if acted upon, would likely result in violation of the 
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
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subject of intense public scrutiny in recent years. But a fair-
minded assessment of that behavior will recognize that every 
misdeed of religious broadcasters can be matched by parallel 
misdeeds by secular broadcasters. It might well be asserted, in 
fact, that non-religious broadcasters are responsible for the 
lion's share of questionable behavior broadcast over the 
airwaves. 
Third, notwithstanding the inevitability of government 
regulation, religious broadcasters have tended to see their 
mission as special and, therefore, have believed that they 
should not be subject to regulation by any worldly or secular 
authority. For many broadcasters, this view is grounded in the 
belief that the air waves are quite literally an instrument given 
by God to facilitate the mission of preaching the Gospel to all 
the nations. They take seriously Christ's commandment to go 
into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. 14 
The ability to transmit the voice and the visual image of the 
preacher has, for the first time in history, made it possible to 
reach all humankind with the Gospel message. 15 When this 
perspective is taken seriously, it is understandable why some 
evangelicals view God's command to spread the Gospel as 
loftier and more worthy of obedience than any mortal decree. It 
is important to note here that this perspective focuses attention 
on the biblical commandment to preach the Gospel, rather than 
on any constitutional right to do so. From a secular perspective, 
however, the real issue is not a divine commandment so much 
as it is one of arrogance-arrogance stemming from the belief 
that religious broadcasters are accountable to God alone and, 
14 Mark 16:15 
15 The history of electronic communication is intertwined with religious 
significance and symbolism which serves to affrrm these evangelical Christians' 
belief that this medium has providential purpose. In 1844 when Samuel F. B. 
Morse completed the installation of the first telegraphic line he seemed to have 
experienced a sense of awe, even sacredness, in what he was doing as is evidenced 
by the choice of his frrst transmission: "What hath God wrought." Head, supra note 
11, at 108. Radio dates back to 1896 with Guglielmo Marconi's discovery of 
wireless communication, but the frrst successful voice transmission occurred a 
decade later when a Canadian engineer, Reginal Fessenden, beamed a signal from 
the coast of Massachusetts to ships at sea on Christmas Eve, 1906. The content of 
this first transmission was a religious service. HADDEN & SWANN, supra note 9, at 
8-9. Marconi provided technical assistance in the construction of Vatican Radio and 
introduced the Holy Father to the world in the inauguration of the first global 
network. DONAW R. BROWNE, INTERNATIONAL RADIO BROADCASTING 306 (1982). 
These and other early developments in radio and television provide the rationale 
evangelicals express for the providential character of broadcasting. 
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hence, that any other accountability would be superfluous. At a 
press conference following Jerry Falwell's assumption of Praise 
The Lord (PTL) leadership in April, 1987, he confessed this to 
be the case-albeit in an underwhelming way: "[we] have had a 
little sense of arrogance out there in the [televangelistic] 
church that it is none of [the Government's] business or 
anybody else's what we do or how we do it."16 Falwell 
promised that "the arrogance is over,"17 but six years after the 
televangelism scandals came to public light, a large proportion 
of America's religious broadcasters still stubbornly refuse to 
open their books to outsiders or to subject themselves to formal 
self-regulation. 
III. INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROLS AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
RELIGIOUS BROADCASTING 
Radio and television broadcasting in the United States 
have passed through four stages of development. Each stage 
corresponds roughly to the formal regulatory environment, 18 
but formal regulatory structures are themselves determined by 
technological, organizational, and social developments. 19 
A. Stage One: Unregulated Broadcast Experimentation 
(1906-1927) 
Reginal Fessenden's offshore airwaves transmission on 
Christmas Eve of 1906 inaugurated broadcasting and the ensu-
ing stage of experimentation.20 The technology was quickly 
grasped and widely explored around the globe. The first regu-
larly scheduled radio broadcast in the United States com-
menced in November, 1920, in Pittsburgh. Owned by Westing-
house Electric, radio station KDKA was created to stimulate 
the sale of radios. Many other radio stations quickly com-
menced regular broadcasting. In less than two years, there 
were 382 stations in operation. In just over four years, there 
16 Excerpts from The Rev. Jerry Falwell's News Conference. THE CHARLOTI'E 
OBSERVER April 29, 1987, at 11A (emphasis added). 
17 Id. 
18 Neuendorf, supra note 6, at 72. 
19 The dates attached to each stage are only rough approximations. 
Beginning dates correspond to specific developments, although the real impact of 
that development may not be felt for some years. Similarly, the denotation of a 
new phase does not usually represent a sharp departure from the previous stage. 
20 See supra note 12. 
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were over 600 stations on the air. By 1927, just seven years 
since the establishment of the KDKA, the number of radio 
stations had escalated to 732.21 And religious organizations 
were into broadcasting from the beginning. For, of the 600 sta-
tions identified by Popular Radio magazine in January, 1925, 
sixty-three were owned by churches and para-church organiza-
tions.22 
By 1924, station owners discovered that they could sell 
time to business organizations to promote their products, and 
the rush to develop privately owned commercial radio was 
underway. Religious stations did not fare well under the stiff 
competition of a market that quickly turned commercial. In 
fairly short order, many of these radio pulpit preachers turned 
out to be short on the capital needed to keep up with the rapid-
ly rising costs and technology of broadcasting, to say nothing of 
the political capital needed to protect themselves from the 
assaults of those who, for commercial reasons, coveted their 
broadcast licenses. While some religious broadcasters were 
blasted off the air by stations with greater power, others faced 
license challenges by commercial stations. Some were squeezed 
out by heavy-handed deals, others sold their licenses, and oth-
ers still simply ceased to broadcast. Those who remained would 
face even stiffer challenges during the second stage of broad-
casting. 
B. Stage Two: Sustaining-Time and the Politics of Exclusion 
(1927-1956) 
During the first stage of experimental radio, commercial 
broadcasters had ample opportunity to observe that religious 
broadcasters tended to be noisy, often intolerant, and otherwise 
controversial. What was more, they came in large numbers 
seeking access to the airwaves. Dealing with them posed no 
small problem. 
Most station owners preferred having liberal Protestants 
on the air to having Fundamentalists or Pentecostals, groups 
who were clamoring for the opportunity. But from the begin-
ning, the liberal Protestant traditions were very much under-
represented. Part of the problem was that liberal Protestants 
were ambivalent about broadcasting. They saw the possibility 
21 Voskuil, supra note 7. 
22 HADDEN & SWANN, supra note 9, at 73-74. 
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of some positive benefits, but they could also see potential neg-
ative consequences, and some were vociferous in their condem-
nation of evangelical broadcasters. 23 Their attacks provided 
legitimacy for the exclusive policies of the broadcast networks 
and the Federal Radio Commission24 (FRC), policies which 
would remain in effect for nearly three decades. 
The formal and informal mechanisms that restricted evan-
gelical access to the airwaves first became evident in the late 
1920s with the creation of FRC and the formation of radio 
networks. 25 In its early years of operation, FRC used its broad 
authority in a rather heavy-handed way. During the late 1920s, 
FRC reassigned some religious stations to low-powered fre-
quencies, determined not to grant new licenses to new religious 
stations, and used its broad regulatory powers to examine com-
plaints that existing religious stations were not operating in 
the "public interest."26 
At this time, the broadcast networks combined their infor-
mal efforts to control evangelical broadcasting. NBC, the first 
radio network, was founded in 1926. At the onset, NBC deter-
mined not to accept paid religious broadcasting. Time allocated 
for religious broadcasting would be offered at no cost (or as 
sustaining-time, as it is called in the industry), but would be 
offered "only [to] the central national agencies of great religious 
faiths."27 The Federal Council of Churches, an affiliation of 
liberal Protestant groups, was solicited for counsel and man-
power for religious broadcasts. This policy explicitly excluded 
"individual churches or small group movements where the 
23 For a treatise that personifies the ambivalence of liberal church leaders 
toward radio and television broadcasting from the onset, see JoHN W. BUCKMAN, 
THE CHURCH IN THE WORLD OF RADIO-TELEVISION (1960). Their response was not 
totally negative. "As early as 1923 the Federal Council of Churches [the forerunner 
of the National Council of Churches] officially encouraged local church federations 
to develop cooperative radio ministries." Voskuil, supra note 5, at 76. This counsel 
was to some measure followed, but liberal church leaders never became as excited 
about the possibilities of broadcasting as did the evangelical traditions. 
24 Forerunner to the FCC. 
25 FRC was created by the Radio Act of 1927, which empowered an inde-
pendent agency to assign frequencies, license stations, review the performance of 
those licensed, and otherwise exercise broad authority in the regulation of broad-
cast communications. 
26 In 1931 the license of a powerful and controversial Los Angeles religious 
broadcaster, "Fighting Bob" Shuler, was withdrawn. 
27 Policy Statement of the NBC Advisory Committee on Religious Activities, in 
JEFFREY K. HADDEN & CHARLES E. SWANN, PRIME TIME PREACHERS, at 77. 
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national membership is comparatively small."28 Small denomi-
nations and independent evangelical broadcasters were thus 
caught in a double bind; for, on the one hand, they were ex-
cluded by network radio, and, on the other they were squeezed 
out by the FRC. But for the free enterprise character of broad-
casting, evangelicals might have been excluded from the air-
waves altogether. 
When CBS radio network was formed in 1927, they needed 
cash and, thus, determined they would sell air-time for reli-
gious broadcasting, but in 1931 they shifted to a policy of sus-
taining-time religious broadcasts only.29 For the next four 
years, the only access to the airwaves for evangelicals was on 
local stations, but this was often difficult. Many local stations 
adopted the networks' policy of sustaining-time only and, fur-
ther, accommodated only "mainline" religious groups.30 
A major breakthrough for evangelicals ca..-ne in 1935 with 
the formation of the Mutual Broadcasting Network (Mutual). 
Mutual accepted paid religious broadcasts, and Charles E. 
Fuller's "The Old-Fashioned Revival Hour" quickly became 
Mutual's largest account. By 1940, paid religious broadcasting 
accounted for more than one-quarter of Mutual's revenues. In 
1943, Mutual seemed ready to join NBC and CBS in a policy of 
sustaining-time only for religious programming, but then re-
versed its decision and announced, instead, restrictive policies. 
Most important among the restrictions was the banning of on-
air solicitation of money from listening audiences. The prohibi-
tion against asking audiences to help pay for the programs 
made it impossible for some broadcasters to continue. 
It is widely believed that Mutual's decision to restrict ac-
cess was the result of pressure from liberal church groups.31 
28 !d. 
29 Ostensibly, this policy shift was to bring CBS into conformity with the 
other network. In reality, it was a means of getting rid of Father Charles 
Coughlin, whose sermons were considered too controversial. CBS, like NBC, called 
upon the Federal Council for assistance in programming. 
30 When evangelicals did get on local stations, they were twice as likely to 
be charged for the air time as were Roman Catholics and mainline Protestants. 
Voskuil, supra note 7, at 76. 
31 Federal Council officials denied this and investigators of the controversy 
have failed to find a smoking gun. It is also likely that both networks and local 
stations were pressured by prospective advertisers for these choice time slots. Wil-
liam Martin, Giving the Winds a Mighty Voice, in AMERICAN EVANGELICALS AND 
THE MAss MEDIA 63 (Quentin J. Schultze ed., 1990). Lowell Saunders, in perhaps 
the most comprehensive investigation of the controversy, concluded that the charges 
against the Federal Council could only be considered hearsay, and that there exist-
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Whether or not there was a conspiracy to exclude religious 
broadcasters from the air, evangelicals were having a difficult 
time gaining access to the air waves. In 1942, they created the 
National Association of Evangelicals, and one of the first offi-
cial acts of that organization was to create a radio committee to 
explore the problem of discrimination in access to the airwaves. 
Furthermore, in April, 1944, just a month after Mutual an-
nounced its policy changes, 150 evangelical broadcasters met in 
Columbus, Ohio, and formed NRB,32 whose first official act 
was to retain a Washington-based communications attorney.33 
NRB claimed some early successes, including gaining access to 
some sustaining time on Mutual and NBC's newly created Blue 
Network (a forerunner to ABC), but then lost some of its initial 
zeal and vitality.34 
The rapid expansion of television in the 1950s, like the 
initial expansion of network radio, caught evangelicals off 
guard. NBC turned again to the Federal Council of Churches 
and representatives of Catholicism and Judaism and moved 
swiftly to put in place a policy that would exclude evangelicals. 
CBS, leery of earlier conflict with evangelicals, added the 
Southern Baptists to its consortium of liberal Protestants, 
there existed a high correlation between the economic health of the broadcasting 
industry and their willingness to sell time to evangelicals. When local stations or 
networks needed money, they sold time to evangelicals. Lowell Saunders, The Na-
tional Religious Broadcasters and the Availability of Commercial Radio Time (1968) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation University of Illinois). 
Whlle there may have been no overt conspiratorial activities to exclude 
evangelicals, there can be no question that the Federal Council preferred to have 
its own members represented on the network airwaves rather than nonmember 
churches. Furthermore, it is clear that many liberal church leaders were openly 
hostile toward the evangelical broadcasters as is evidenced in the editorial policy of 
The Christian Century, long the most prominent independent publication of liberal 
Protestantism. When Mutual announced its decision to restrict access, The Chris-
tian Century published an article bitterly complaining that they had not gone far 
enough: 
The network religious radio program racket, capitalized by independent 
super-fundamentalist revivalists, will not be eliminated nationally until 
Mutual goes the whole way and bans paid religious programs altogether, 
as the other networks have done. 
Charles W. Crowe, Religion on the Air, 61 THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY 973-74 (1944). 
32 Ralph M. Jennings, Policies and Practices in Selected National Religious 
Bodies as Related to Broadcasting in the Public Interest, 1920-1950, 317 (1968) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University). 
33 JAMES DEFOREST MURCH, ADVENTURES FOR CHRIST IN CHANGING TIMES, 
173 (1973). 
34 JEFFREY K. HADDEN & ANSON SHUPE, TELEVANGELISM: POWER AND POLI-
TICS ON GoD'S FRONTIER, 48 (1988). 
404 BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 8 
Catholics, and Jews. The Southern Baptists were evangelical, 
but not members of NRB. Thus, the large body of small evan-
gelical denominations and independent broadcasters were effec-
tively cut out of access to national television at the same time 
they were struggling to keep a foothold in national radio. 
In summary, the late 1920s through the mid-1950s saw the 
rapid expansion of television and the formation of networks.35 
This period also saw evangelical broadcasters excluded from 
the communications marketplace. 36 One can pose questions of 
prejudice and First Amendment rights of access, but these 
questions are moot today. If evangelical preachers perceived 
their problem in constitutional terms of free access, they did 
not take their fight to the courts. Most important, however, is 
the fact that, at the time, evangelical religious broadcasters 
were not well-organized enough to challenge those who did not 
want them on the airwaves. 
C. Stage Three: Free Market Access (1956-1977) 
From the Radio Act of 1927, it has always been understood 
that an important criterion for retaining a broadcasting license 
is "public service" broadcasting. Just how much public service 
time is necessary has never been explicitly defined, but it has 
always been clear that religious programming constitutes pub-
lic service. In 1960, the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) ruled that there was no intrinsic relationship between 
sustaining-time and public service. The implications of this 
ruling were monumental, for both religious broadcasters and 
local stations. Under the ruling, local stations could sell air-
time for religious programs and still get FCC "public interest 
credit." Under the ruling, evangelical broadcasters found cause 
to renew their commitment to buying religious air-time. Their 
faith was buoyed. Market forces explain the rest of the story. 
The ensuing competition between religious broadcasters for 
religious air-time became fierce. Fierce competition greatly 
35 A few radio broadcasters, like Charles E. Fuller and Walter E. Maier, 
gained network access and, thus, large national audiences. But on the whole, evan-
gelicals found themselves struggling for access in local markets. The combination of 
a competitive free market and an unsympathetic Federal Radio Commission made 
it difficult for them to own radio stations. The policies of NBC and CBS offered 
access only through sustaining-time, and the cozy relationships the networks 
formed with the Federal Council of Churches alliance substantially blocked access 
to outlets for reaching a national audience. 
36 !d. 
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enhanced the value of the air-time, which fact, in its turn, 
prompted many local stations, which had previously abstained 
from selling air-time to religious broadcasters, to cash in on the 
new demand. 37 
In the course of the next two decades, the landscape of 
religious broadcasting was transformed from the rule of sus-
taining-time to the dominance of free market access. By 1977, 
ninety-two percent of all religious broadcasting in the U.S. was 
paid-time programming,38 the overwhelming majority of which 
was being purchased by evangelicals. 39 
The 1960 ruling of the FCC was a watershed in the long 
struggle of evangelicals to gain access to the airways. I have 
identified 1956 rather than 1960 as the beginning of this free 
market stage of religious broadcasting, because that was the 
year that James DeForest Murch became the executive director 
of the National Religious Broadcasters. Murch took several 
important initiatives that quickly made NRB a big player in 
the communications business. The most important step was to 
take the annual meetings of the NRB to Washington, D.C. In 
his autobiography, Murch explained his reasoning: 
I felt that our position would be immensely strengthened if 
we could take our national convention to the Nation's Capital. 
This was the seat of the Federal Communications Commission 
and the lawmakers who could assure our constitutional rights 
to freedom of religion and freedom of speech on the airwaves. 
It was also the seat of the industry's National Association of 
Broadcasters and the leading trade journal of the industry, 
Broadcasting magazine. 40 
One of Murch's early and most important moves was to call 
on Sol Taishoff, editor and publisher of Broadcasting. Murch 
persuaded Taishoff that evangelicals had a legitimate com-
plaint and created in Taishoff a champion of NRB's campaign 
to purchase air-time. Murch and other NRB leaders also found 
their way to the offices of the FCC and pleaded their case for 
37 HADDEN & SHUPE, supra note 34, at 51. 
38 Report by the Communications Committee of the U.S. Catlwlic Conference, 
in PETER G. HORSFIELD, RELIGIOUS TELEVISION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 89 
(1984). 
39 The networks produced their sustaining-time religious programs for more 
than a decade, but with the lure of big bucks from the syndicated televangelists, 
local affiliates elected not to run the network productions. 
40 MURCH, supra note 33, at 179. 
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fair treatment. 
Soon enough, evangelical broadcasters moved beyond gain-
ing mere parity with religious broadcasters of the "mainline" 
religious traditions. Eventually, evangelical broadcasters ac-
quired absolute dominance of the religious airwaves, a domi-
nance which they have maintained until the present. Just how 
have they maintained this absolute dominance? NRB continues 
to hold its influential annual meetings in Washington, D.C., 
meetings which perennially feature an appearance by the Pres-
ident of the United States and which attract the faithful atten-
dance of the Commissioners of the FCC. One former FCC Com-
missioner recently commented that the religious broadcasters 
"have a lobbying capability that makes the National Rifle Asso-
ciation seem like a bunch of rank amateurs.'>41 
Liberal Protestants and Catholics have attempted to check 
the dominance of evangelical broadcasters along two lines.42 
First, liberal Protestants and Catholics have argued that a 
license to broadcast is a public trust, that those who hold this 
trust are obliged to offer sustaining-time for religious program-
ming, and, further, that mainline religious traditions ought to 
be the recipients of such gratis air-time. Second, liberal Protes-
tants and Catholics have assailed the worthiness not only of 
evangelical broadcasters, but also of television as a medium. 
The argument runs roughly like this: televangelists are scoun-
drels using a medium that is inherently corrupting.43 In short, 
liberal Protestants and Catholics find difficulty in arguing for 
entitlement to gratuitous access to a medium that they barely 
trust. But this ambivalence towards the broadcast media is one 
they have lived with for the better part of the century. 
The growth of syndicated religious broadcasting occurred 
during the 1970s as individual televangelists purchased air-
time station-by-station. During the 1980s the marketplace of 
syndicated religious broadcasters became saturated. This led to 
increased competition that drove the cost of air-time beyond the 
41 Personal interview, May 17, 1991. I did not sense that the former com-
missioner meant this literally but, rather, intended to emphasize the fact that 
religious broadcasters are sophisticated lobbyists. 
42 The office of the Assistant General Secretary for Communications of the 
Nation Council of Churches has been the focal point of the counterattack. 
43 William F. Fore, until recently the assistant general secretary for com-
munications of the National Council of Churches, is the most important spokes-
person for this argument. For an introduction to this perspective, see WILUAM F. 
FORE, TELEVISION AND RELIGION (1987). 
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means of the broadcasters to pay, i.e., beyond their capability 
to raise money from the small proportion of the viewers who 
were willing to send in a donation. One theory advanced re-
garding the underlying conditions precipitating the scandals 
was that the market had become saturated and some broad-
casters were covertly seeking reduced competition.44 
D. Stage Four: Techno-legal Regulation (1977-present) 
As important as the televangelism scandals seemed at the 
time, they were relatively unimportant in terms of the overall 
regulatory picture. As noted at the beginning of this inquiry, 
the scandals did not escape the attention of various govern-
ment regulatory agencies, but there was no zealous crusade to 
legislate or find existing regulatory structures that could be 
used to put the pinch on broadcasters. This was true for at 
least three reasons. 
First, religious broadcasters succeeded in creating the 
impression that they had taken bold initiatives toward self-
regulation. Several months before the PTL scandal broke, NRB 
approved in principle a plan to create an Ethics and Financial 
Integrity Commission (EFICOM). In the wake of the PTL scan-
dal, NRB contracted with the Evangelical Council for Financial 
Accountability (ECF A) to independently manage EFICOM. In 
the end, NRB rhetoric was stronger than self-regulatory reali-
ty.45 Impressions, nonetheless, counted for much. 
Second, legislators who might have been inclined to craft 
legislation designed to reign in religious broadcasters quickly 
became aware of the difficulty of doing so without tackling 
much broader issues of broadcast regulation. The 1970s and 
1980s witnessed ever broadening acceptance of what could 
44 This thesis can be pursued in many possible directions. For example, 
when Marvin Gorman, an Assemblies of God minister, began to develop a signifi-
cant television ministry in Louisiana, Jimmy Swaggart brought charges of sexual 
misconduct before the Assemblies of God. Gorman was defrocked and subsequently 
lost his New Orleans church and television ministry. Swaggart subsequently threat-
ened to bring Jim Bakker's sexual improprieties before the Assembly of God. When 
this became public knowledge, Swaggart denied that he had his eye on the PTL 
Network. Jerry Falwell similarly denied that his motivation for taking over PTL 
had anything to do with acquiring a network for his own broadcasting ambitions. 
The truth of the "economic motivation" thesis will probably never be proven. For 
some of the best investigative research on this thesis see CHARLES E. SHEPARD, 
FORGIVEN (1989); LARRY MARTZ, MINISTRY OF GREED (1988). 
45 See NRB Moves Slowly to Enforce Ethics Code, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, 
March 9, 1992, at 59. 
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appear in print, cinema, and on the airwaves under the "free 
speech" protection of the First Amendment. To regulate even 
the most outrageous televangelists would necessarily pose the 
question of the limits of First Amendment protection for the 
bizarre antics of the likes of Howard Stern and Morton Downey 
Jr. If the First Amendment doesn't protect broadcasters like 
Stern, then perhaps censorship of "Geraldo" and "Donahue" 
would be around the corner. Even the thought of a slippery 
slope towards greater regulation of commercial broadcasting 
serves as a powerful antidote against proposals to regulate 
radio and television preachers. 
The third, and perhaps most important factor mitigating 
against the rush to regulate the televangelists, was the fact 
that the marketplace itself responded swiftly and effectively. 
Upon learning of the televangelism scandals of 1987-88, tens of 
thousands of formerly loyal viewers closed their checkbooks 
with devastating consequences. Virtually every television min-
istry in America was negatively impacted by the scandals. Six 
years after the scandals first broke, the religious broadcasting 
industry remains shrouded with public doubt as to its integrity. 
Of course, formerly loyal viewers had time to sort things out. 
And, on the whole, non-scandalized ministries eventually recov-
ered both viewers and revenues. 
In sharp contrast, scandalized ministries suffered serious 
and ostensibly permanent losses. Jim and Tammy Faye Bakker 
were forced to leave the air when the PTL scandal broke. Their 
network went bankrupt within a week, heroic fund-raising 
efforts of Jerry Falwell notwithstanding. The scandalized min-
istries of Jimmy Swaggart, Oral Roberts and Robert Tilton 
have all paid a heavy price as well. Even though all three re-
main on the air, each has been reduced to but a shadow of 
bygone glory. And there is no credible evidence to suggest that 
any of them will be able to rebuild to the point where they 
approach past financial and audience achievements. 
The marketplace, then, has constituted a key force in both 
formal and informal regulation of religious broadcasters. Ulti-
mately, a free press, not government regulatory intervention, 
brought the crimes and moral misdeeds of these televangelists 
to the attention of the public. The viewing public, in turn, 
played an important regulatory role by switching channels and 
closing their checkbooks. It may not be a perfect regulatory 
system, but it worked efficiently throughout the late 1980s. 
AI3 I read the history of religious broadcast regulation, the 
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fourth stage had been in progress fully a decade, when the 
scandals of the late 1980s broke. A defining feature of the 
fourth stage has been the rapid development of expensive, 
highly sophisticated delivery technology. Another defining fea-
ture of the fourth stage has been the expanding role litigation 
has come to play in the affairs of religious broadcasters. This 
latter feature is an inevitable consequence of rapid, technologi-
cally-driven growth and of the expanding role litigation has 
played generally in promoting individual and collective ad-
vancement. 
1. Technology 
In a strict sense, technology does not regulate religious 
broadcasting. But technology is a powerful factor in defining 
the parameters wherein broadcasting operates. The growth of 
communication technologies permitted rapid expansion of syn-
dicated programming, satellite transmission, personalized di-
rect mail and telemarketing, among other things. These inno-
vations in communications technology were the driving force 
behind the phenomenal growth of televangelism during the 
1970s and 1980s. Television ministries became big precisely 
because all of these technologies made rapid growth of 
parachurch organizations possible. 
The technological advances that spawned dozens of syndi-
cated religious television programs seems now to be working 
toward the concentration of economic power in religious broad-
casting. This process can be dated to April 29, 1977, when the 
Christian Broadcasting Network transmitted its first satellite 
broadcast. In rapid succession, Trinity Broadcasting Network 
was founded in southern California, followed by the PTL Net-
work in North Carolina. All three networks had state-of-the-art 
technology poised to deliver religious programming via cable 
even before the wiring of the nation for cable began in earnest. 
That cabling process was substantially achieved in the 1980s 
and continues towards saturation in the 1990s. 
While the cabling of the nation has resulted in a signifi-
cant loss of market share for the three major television net-
works, the religious networks have been among the beneficia-
ries of this redistribution of viewers. The costs for broadcasting 
on major networks have always been prohibitive for religious 
telecasters. This option will become even more prohibitive in 
the future. Loss of market share by major networks has not 
driven down the cost of air-time, but merely reduced the trajec-
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tory of soaring costs. Similarly, local network-affiliated stations 
will continue to command top dollar for the purchase of air-
time. 
This portends a decline in syndicated religious broadcast-
ing on local network stations. Religious broadcasters simply 
will not be able to raise adequate revenues to pay the high cost 
of being on the several hundred local network stations. Thus, it 
is increasingly clear that the future of religious broadcasting is 
in satellite delivery via cable television. The only economically 
viable long-term alternative for syndicated broadcasters is to 
turn to religious networks and a growing number of low power 
religious stations. Those who have satellite delivery capability, 
and have established an extensive network of cable systems to 
which they can deliver their programs, are in a position to 
dominate the future market. 
At the present time there are four religious networks with 
significant cable access: Christian Broadcasting Network 
(CBN), Trinity Broadcasting Network (TBN), Vision Interfaith 
Satellite Network/American Christian Television System 
(VISN/ACTS), and Eternal Word Network (EWN). Pat 
Robertson's CBN now operates under the umbrella of the Fami-
ly Channel which ranks among the largest cable systems in the 
nation. In late 1991 the Family Channel reached 92 percent of 
all cable households and 59 percent of all households in Ameri-
ca.4s 
Of the three networks devoted exclusively to religious pro· 
gramming, TBN is the most viable. Founder and owner Paul 
Crouch has aggressively bought up small powered television 
stations in addition to expanding cable system coverage. While 
Crouch is Pentecostal, and this is emphasized in programming, 
he is well positioned to sell air-time to non-pentecostal Evan-
gelicals. 
VISN is a collaborative effort of 28 main line Protestant, 
Jewish, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox groups. ACTS 
was founded by the Radio and Television Commission of the 
Southern Baptist Church. Neither network allows on-air solici-
46 The Family Channel broadcasts The 700 Club, the flagship telecast of 
CBN, daily, and offers other related religious programs plus a substantial outlet 
for religious programming on Sunday. While Robertson found "family oriented pro· 
gramming" to be more profitable than a full diet of religious programming, the 
program schedule of the Family Channel is potentially elastic and could return to 
more religious broadcasting should that become profitable. 
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tation of funds. Both organizations have experienced financial 
difficulties and in 1992 began sharing a single cable channel. 
EWN was founded by Sister Angelica, a Roman Catholic nun 
from Alabama. While both VISN/ACTS and EWN currently 
have significant cable outlets across the nation, these opera-
tions do not appear to have adequate capitalization or manage-
ment resources to be competitive in the long run competition 
for cable outlets. Even now, they are dependent on free access 
to cable systems. This gratuitous relationship with cable own-
ers is unlikely to persist unless mandated by the Federal Com-
munications Commission, which appears unlikely. The un-
known quotient is the potential of technology to produce un-
foreseen and unanticipated options for production of delivery of 
television. 
2. Litigation 
The second half of the Twentieth Century has experienced 
a significant growth in the social welfare state. Social move-
ments and lobbying have identified ever expanding domains 
where the benevolent social welfare state "ought" to protect or 
serve its citizens. Litigation has increasingly become the in-
strument whereby individuals and organizations press their 
claims for access to resources. Religious organizations general-
ly, and religious broadcasters in particular, have not escaped 
this trend. Over the past decade-and-a-half, major ministries 
have devoted increasing resources to legal matters. Some of the 
increased legal work reflects a need among religious broadcast-
ers for legal counsel in contractual matters as well as in mat-
ters respecting regulatory compliance. But religious broadcast-
ers have been increasingly involved in litigation, both as defen-
dants and as plaintiffs. Legal proceedings involving religious 
broadcasters have occurred on a wide range of issues. I can 
here offer only illustrations. 
One of the major struggles religious broadcasters have 
faced is the issue of their tax-exempt status. In 1983 the State 
Board of Equalization of California revoked the tax-exempt 
status of Robert Schuller's Crystal Cathedral in response to the 
use of the cathedral for admission charging events. The Board 
of Equalization subsequently agreed to a compromise in which 
taxes would be paid on part of the Crystal Cathedral's "facili-
ties used for such non-exempt commercial purposes as concerts 
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and community group meetings."47 A ministry spokesperson 
characterized the taxation issue as "the beginning of a new 
kind of harassment [of] religious institutions."48 
Religious broadcasters as defendants: California was also 
the scene of Swaggart v. Board of Equalization,49 which has 
not received great attention, but which nonetheless has had tax 
exemption implications for religious broadcasters specifically 
and for religious institutions more generally. This case involved 
the authority of the state of California to collect taxes on vari-
ous items, including religious records, tapes, and books sold by 
the Swaggart ministry to Californians. The Supreme Court 
upheld a decision by the California appeals court permitting 
the state to tax items sold by the Swaggart ministry. The deci-
sion leaves open the question of whether any religious organi-
zation has a constitutional right to tax exemption. 
Religion-based tax exemption challenges have also been 
brought against the ministries of television preachers by indi-
viduals. In Virginia, two Lynchburg residents appealed a Cir-
cuit Court ruling granting Jerry Falwell's Liberty University 
the right to issue $61 million in tax-free government bonds on 
the grounds that this violated the Separation Clause.50 Ulti-
mately, the Virginia Supreme Court blocked the issuance of the 
tax-free bonds. Falwell, electing not to appeal to the Supreme 
Court, turned to Kemper SecuritieP for assistance with a pri-
vate bond sale. Kemper, finding no market interest in the 
bonds, withdrew from the underwriting agreement. Falwell, in 
tum, sued Kemper for default.51 The parties agreed to submit 
the dispute to arbitration. Arbitrators subsequently found the 
case "without merit."52 
Religious broadcasters as plaintiffs: Jerry Falwell sued 
Hustler magazine for "intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress" resulting from a satirical parody. 53 In anticipation of his 
bid for the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1988, 
47 Crystal Cathedral to Pay Back Taxes on Concert Receipts, N.Y. TIMES, 
August 31, 1983, at AlB. 
48 ld. 
49 493 U.S. 378 (1990). 
50 U.S. CaNST., amend. I. 
51 Liberty University v. Kemper Securities Group, Civil Action No. 90-0075-L 
(W.D. Va.). 
52 Liberty University v. Kemper Securities Group, AAA Arbitration No. 11-
136-00194-91. 
53 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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Pat Robertson sued former California Congressman Paul "Pete" 
McCloskey and Indiana Congressman Andrew Jacobs for mak-
ing statements about his Korean War military record that were 
alleged to be "wanton and reckless."54 Neither Falwell nor 
Robertson's suits were ultimately successful, but they illustrate 
a perceived need to protect the good name and reputation of 
religious broadcasters. Interestingly, both Falwell and Robert-
son publicly interpreted the litigation outcome as vindicating 
their positions. 
Apart from the need to litigate, legal departments have 
become a part of virtually every television ministry for other 
reasons. They seek to develop endowments and trust funds for 
long term support of their ministries. In addition to developing 
trusts and endowments, the legal departments of television 
ministries, more often than other nonprofit organizations, face 
challenges to wills by heirs of those who have made significant 
bequests. 
More recently, radio and television ministries have found 
themselves embroiled in controversy and litigation with former 
employees. In the wake of the PTL scandals, CBN placed The 
700 Club co-host Danuta Soderman on "temporary leave of 
absence" after the publication of her autobiography that includ-
ed a discussion of a love affair outside of marriage. CBN, sens-
ing that this could be grist for media that was on a feeding 
frenzy with the PTL scandal, concluded that they could not risk 
having Soderman, who had been called the, "Barbara Walters 
of Christian television," on the air. Ms. Soderman quietly dis-
appeared from the scene.55 
Religious broadcasters also need good legal counsel to keep 
abreast of developments in constitutional law affect free exer-
cise. Take for example, Employment Division v. Smith,56 a Su-
preme Court case potentially with significant implications for 
the regulation of religious broadcasting. If Smith effectively 
establishes the precedent that religious organizations are enti-
tled to no substantive protection under the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment, then religious broadcast-
ers-along with other religious organizations-stand to be 
entangled in a much broader web of government regulation. 
54 Charles R. Babcock & T.R. Reid, Robertson's Libel Suit Dismissed, WASH. 
POST, March 8, 1988, at A6. 
55 CBN Co-Host Is Reassigned, THE DAILY PROGRESS, June 26, 1987. 
56 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
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Or, take the recent passage of the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act57 (RFRA), an act intended to lessen, if not alto-
gether to defeat, the impact of Smith. Will RFRA substantially 
alter the fact that religious broadcasters have become deeply 
and increasingly involved in all kinds of litigation? Probably 
not. But, as a general proposition, we can postulate that reli-
gious broadcasters can expect to continue to spend precious re-
sources on legal matters. It follows that, whereas larger minis-
tries can more easily allocate resources to deal with legal costs, 
small ministries can be easily overwhelmed by such costs. 
In the years since the PTL scandal, other religious broad-
cast employees have declined passively to accept what they per-
ceive to be mistreatment by their employers. James Dobson's 
radio program Focus on the Family is broadcast daily on 1,350 
outlets, second only to Paul Harvey. When co-host Gil 
Moegerle's marriage ended in divorce in 1987, Dobson reas-
signed Moegerle to the film department. Some months later, 
Moegerle married an employee of the ministry. Subsequently, 
both resigned claiming they were forced out. Moegerle sued 
claiming, among other things, "invasion of privacy, interference 
with business activities, and wrongful termination."58 More 
recently, Bob Larson Ministries, which broadcasts a radio and 
television talk-show, has been a hotbed of employee grievances, 
including wrongful dismissal, sexual harassment, nonpayment 
of accrued overtime, and the like. 59 The day of religious broad-
cast employees passively accepting managerial decisions that 
affect their lives appears now to be a thing of the past. 
This discussion of the impact of technology and the in-
creasing propensity for problems to be resolved by litigation 
draws attention to the fact that the religious broadcasting 
industry no longer lives in a world apart. They have entered 
the mainstream of society. They have utilized technology to 
great advantage, even as technology has shaped the character 
of their ministry. An increasingly litigious society is similarly 
impacting religious broadcasting in ways that are only now 
beginning to be understood. 
57 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 
1488 (1993). 
58 3 NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RELIGION REPORT, No. 3, January 16, 
1989, at 6. 
59 Timothy C. Morgan, Personnel Woes Persist at Larson Ministries, 37 
CHR!ffi'IANITY TODAY 62 (1993). 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
TELEVANGELISM 
415 
We have come a long way since a leading religious broad-
caster sent signals of varying strength in directions of her own 
choosing, and then sassed the Secretary of Commerce telling 
him, in effect, that where she sent her broadcast signals was a 
matter of concern only between her and the Almighty. That 
Aimee Semple McPherson did this, much less that she got 
away with it, seems today almost incomprehensible. Even Jerry 
Falwell's 1987 confession, on behalf of religious broadcasters, of 
"a little sense of arrogance" in believing that they were answer-
able only to God, seems archaic. 
From the very beginning, it was inevitable that broadcast-
ing and its related technologies would have to be regulated. 
What may be amazing is that we have not had much more 
regulation. The full implications of technological and legal 
developments on religious broadcasting cannot be fully under-
stood at this point. It is possible, however, to offer at least 
limited speculation about how technology and legal process will 
affect the future of religious broadcasting. 
First, the informal mechanisms of regulation discussed in 
this paper will continue to impact religious broadcasting. Net-
works, audiences, the press, and market competition will con-
tinue to play a significant role in shaping religious broadcast-
ing. 
Second, technology is a double-edged sword. On the one 
hand, the spread of technology tends to lower per unit cost to 
religious broadcasters and, thus, invites more players to enter 
the competition. The cost of a television studio and equipment 
once made participation in competition prohibitive. Today, local 
public access channels provide the opportunity for virtually 
everyone with an interest to try their hand at producing televi-
sion programming. Nearly two decades ago the National Reli-
gious Broadcasters were offering regional workshops to would-
be religious broadcasters. The novice could not then, and still 
cannot compete head on with broadcasters owning state of the 
art equipment. But skillful use of video equipment can still put 
one in business. In the past, the best of the local religious 
broadcasters were soon entering multiple markets, syndicating, 
and becoming contenders for national markets. Rising costs are 
rapidly closing off this option. 
At the same time that technology was making it possible 
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for more players to get in the game, the expansion of satellite 
transmission and cable redirected delivery into the hands of a 
few who controlled access to satellites and cables. The result 
has diminished the role of syndicated programming except for 
those that have the resources to contract with networks. This 
trend is almost certain to continue. Programming that cannot 
deliver large markets, e.g. religious broadcasting, will become 
increasingly hard to sustain by syndicated selling to individual 
stations. While individual broadcasters will be able to buy time 
on satellite networks, their opportunities for developing large 
audiences will be significantly restricted. 
In short, while technological innovations of the 1970s and 
1980s made it possible for more broadcasters to syndicate, the 
technology of the 1990s is shifting delivery to cable via satel-
lite. This development concentrates power in the hands of those 
who control the delivery technology. They will reserve prime 
viewing time for their own programming and cut hard bargains 
with independent newcomers. 
Third, the second half of the Twentieth Century has seen 
an enormous expansion in the role of litigation in resolving 
competing claims for resources and demands for justice. Feder-
al and state government agencies play an increasing role in the 
pursuit of claims, acting as enforcers of legislatively mandated 
regulations, interpreters of regulations, and investigators of 
claims brought by individuals. Even though most religious 
broadcasters are organized as tax-exempt organizations and, as 
such, are not subject to many state and federal rules that gov-
ern corporations, litigation and the need to comply with govern-
ment regulations still impact religious broadcasters in many 
ways. As the religion-based tax exemption cases suggest, such 
regulations will continue to be a serious issue. 
Finally, the future shape of broadcasting will be deter-
mined in part, at least, by technological developments that are 
yet to be discovered or invented. Since we don't know what 
these developments may be, we cannot anticipate their impact. 
But on the basis of everything we know about the first nine de-
cades of technological development in broadcasting, we can 
anticipate that religious broadcasting is unlikely to be affected 
in ways very different from commercial broadcasting. Although 
both experienced a long history of only minimal regulation, 
that era seems likely to be coming to a close. 
